Land & Water Law Review
Volume 13

Issue 2

Article 5

1978

The Ordinary High Water Mark: Attempts at Settling an Unsettled
Boundary Line
Frank E. Maloney

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water

Recommended Citation
Maloney, Frank E. (1978) "The Ordinary High Water Mark: Attempts at Settling an Unsettled Boundary
Line," Land & Water Law Review: Vol. 13 : Iss. 2 , pp. 465 - 499.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol13/iss2/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Land & Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Law Archive of Wyoming
Scholarship.

Maloney: The Ordinary High Water Mark: Attempts at Settling an Unsettled B
University of Wyoming
College of Law

LAND AND WATER
LAW REVIEW
1978

VOLUME XIII

NUMBER2

The ordinary high water line is typically defined as the boundary between privately-owned riparian uplands and publicly-owned lands beneath

non-tidal navigable waters. Dean Maloney considers the definition of the or-

dinary high water line, the question of whether federal common law controls
the definition of the line, the use of the meander line as an alternative boundary, the necessity of an ambulatory line, and the question of whether a definition based on statistical averaging would be legally valid.

THE ORDINARY HIGH WATER
MARK: ATTEMPTS AT SETTLING
AN UNSETTLED BOUNDARY LINE
Frank E. Maloney*
INTRODUCTION

It would seem that something as basic to the determinaion of property rights as the method for establishing the
boundaries of lands bordering navigable inland waters would
be more than well-settled in the law. In most states and in the
federal system the ordinary high water line' (OHWL) is the
boundary between privately-owned riparian uplands and publicly-owned sovereignty lands beneath non-tidal navigable
Copyright(g) 1978 by the University of Wyoming.

i

*Professor of Law and Dean Emeritus, University of Florida Law Center; B.A.,
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1. Most cases defining ordinary high water line or ordinary high water mark use the
two terms interchangeably. Even though the word "mark" seems to describe a
point on the bank rather than a continuous line, most cases clearly recognize that
"mark" or even "point" means "line" in this context. See, e.g., Tilden v. Smith,
113 So. 708, 712 (Fla. 1927). At least one case has stated that the terms are "synonymous." City of Manhattan Beach v. Cortelyou, 10 Cal. 2d 653, 76 P.2d 483,
487 (1938). See generally 19A WORDS AND PHRASES 80 (1970); 30 WORDS AND
PHRASES 429 (1972); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 1763 (4th ed. 1951). For purposes of consistency, this article will use the term ordinary high water line (OHWL)
as inclusive of all other variants of wording.
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waters. 2 Ironically, the determination of the OHWL is as confused as it is important.
The most significant aspect of the OHWL is its operation
as a boundary for purposes of title. It delineates the riparian
upland with its concomitant entitlement to certain rights not
available to the public generally 3 from the submerged bed
owned by the sovereign4 and usually held in trust for public
use, enjoyment and protection.5 Additionally, the title to
powlands below the OHWL is held subject to the paramount
6
er of Congress to regulate commerce and navigation.
The OHWL is not the only standard used to separate public and private interests in navigable water bodies. A number
of states7 have chosen the line of ordinary low water' to accomplish this purpose. The low water line allows the riparian
owner a greater property interest and, where seasonal influences cause significant fluctuation in water elevation, would
include title to the exposed shore as well. In states recognizing the OHWL, any such exposed area between the OHWL
and the actual water level at the moment is part of the public
domain and the public may be allowed to travel along it or
even recreate there.'
2.

3.
4.

5.
6.
7.

8.

9.

It is important to understand at the outset the scope of applicability of the OHWL
definition. It applies to non-tidal, navigable water bodies, generally inland from the
coast. It does not apply to inland non-navigable, and therefore privately-owned water bodies, although it may have some relevance in that context where the extent
of surface usage of riparian owners must be defined. Cf., Diana Shooting Club v.
Husting, 145 N.W. 816 (Wis. 1914); Duval v. Thomas, 114 So.2d 791 (Fla. 1959);
Publix Super Market, Inc. v. Pearson, 315 So.2d 98 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
See generally TRELEASE, WATER LAW: RESOURCE USE AND ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION 238-456 (2d ed. 1974).
The interests of the state in ownership and control of the bed, e.g., navigation, recreation, conservation, are quite different from the traditional property interests of
the individual upland owner. The distinction has taken on added significance since
the case of Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973), which suggests that
the nature and extent of sovereign ownership and control may be limited according
to the interests which the public actually has in maintaining title to the bed. In
some situations, for example, sovereign ownership may be limited where the value
of the bed is restricted to particularized public uses such as navigation and recreation.
Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574 (1922), appeal denied, 260 U.S. 711 (1922); The
Abby Dodge, 223 U.S. 166 (1912); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
Including Alabama, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Virginia and West Virginia. See 78 AM.JUR. 2d Water 386 (1975) for a compilation with case citations.
The ordinary low water mark may be defined to be the usual and common or ordinary stage of the river, when the volume of water is not increased by rains or freshets, nor diminished below such usual stage or volume by long continued drouth, to
extreme low water mark. Nance v. Womack, 2 Shannon's Cases 202 (Tenn. 1877).
Some jurisdictions, however, have denied public use of the shore on the theory that
it interferred with the riparian owner's "exclusive privileges." See. e.g., Doeml v.
Jantz, 180 Wis. 225, 193 NW. 393 (1923), criticized in Waite. Public Rights to Use
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It should also be noted that there are lands within the
United States which were acquired from Mexico and Spain
and which included submerged lands under navigable waters
previously conveyed to private ownership. The general rule is
that the foreign law in force at the time of the grant will govern the area, nature and extent of such conveyances.10 In
other words, a valid grant of title to submerged lands into private ownership before such lands were ceded to the United
States would be preserved, 1 ' thereby preventing the acquisition of title by the state through operation of the equal footing doctrine which granted to new states the same "right, sovereignty, and jurisdiction . . . as the original states possess
within their respective borders",' 2 including title to lands under navigable waters.
The OHWL should be clearly distinguished from the
mean high tide line of waters subject to tidal influence. 3 The
primary distinction is that the latter is determined through a
statistical averaging technique 14 while the former is generally
ascertainable by reference to the physical characteristics of
the banks and bed of the water body." 5 The leading definition of the OHWL emphasizes the actual, physical nature of
the line.
This line is to be found by examining the bed and
banks and ascertaining where the presence and action
of waters are so common and usual and so long continued in all ordinary years, as to mark upon the soil
of the bed a character distinct from that of the banks,
as well as in respect to the
in respect to vegetation,
6
nature of the soil itself.
Thus, the determination of the OHWL depends in large part
upon several factors which are physical characteristics of the
and Have Access to Navigable Waters, 1958 WIS. L. REV. 335, 371-74. See generally MALONEY, PLAGER & BALDWIN, WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION Chs. 4-5

(1967).
10.

See Hill, Spanish and Mexican Land Grants Between the Nueces and Rio Grande, 5

S. TEX. L.J. 47 (1960).
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Knight v. United Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161 (1891); State v. Grubstake Inv. Ass'n,
117 Tex. 53, 297 S.W. 202 (1927); Apalachicola Land & Development Co. v. McRae, 86 Fla. 393,98 So. 505 (1923).
Mumford v. Wardwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 423, 436 (1867); Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan,
44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
See generally Maloney & Ausness, The Use and Legal Significance of the Mean High
Water Line in Coastal Boundary Mapping, 53 N.C.L. REV. 185 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Coastal Boundary Mapping].
Id. at 195-98.
Willis v. United States, 50 F. Supp. 99 (S.D. W.Va. 1943); Kelly's Creek & Northwestern R.R. Co. v. United States, 100 Ct. Cl. 396 (1943).
Howard v. Ingersoll, 54 U.S. 381, 427 (1851) (Concurring Opinion of Curtis, J.).
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bed and banks.1" The efficacy of the determination depends
upon how closely these physical indicators correlate with the
common and ordinary level of the water.
Three recent cases from the United States Supreme
Court 8 provide the major impetus for this article. These cases
raise questions regarding traditional legal theory associated
with the OHWL and the role of the state and federal courts
in its determination. In order to cover these questions as fully
as possible, this article will address what the author considers
to be the most critical points: the definition of the OHWL,
the question of whether federal common law controls the
definition of the line, the use of the meander line as an alternative boundary, the necessity of an ambulatory line, and
the question of whether a definition based on statistical averaging would be legally valid.
DEFINITION OF THE ORDINARY HIGH WATER LINE
The source of the modem definition of the OHWL is the
leading case of Howard v. Ingersoll." At issue was the meaning of a call in a deed conveying land from Georgia to the
United States, which land later became part of the State of
Alabama. The boundary was described as running up the
western bank of the Chattahooche River.20 The three opinions
rendered in the case do little, however, to establish a clear
definition.
Mr. Justice Wayne speaking for the majority construed
the language of the call to mean the "water line impressed
upon the bank." ' 21 But, rather than clarifying his definition,
his explanation was confusing and tended toward what with
hindsight we would call over-breadth.
When banks of rivers were spoken of, those boundaries
were meant which contain their waters at their highest flow .... [The line] neither takes in overflowed
land beyond the bank, nor includes swamps or low
17.

See text accompanying notes 28 to 35, infra.

21.

Id. at 415.

18. Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd.v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co._U.S.-, 97 S.Ct.
582 (1977); Utah v. United States, 425 U.S. 948 (1976), for full text see Report
of Special Master reproduced in 1976 UTAH L. REv. 245; Bonelli Cattle Co. v.
Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973).
19. 54 U.S. 381 (1851).
20. Id. at 397.
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grounds liable to be overflowed, but reclaimed for
meadows or agriculture.. . . Such a line may be found
upon every river, from its source to its mouth. It requires no scientific exploration to find or mark it out.
The eye traces it in22going either up or down a river, in
any stage of water.
The main problem with this version is that it apparently contemplates drawing the line at the "highest flow" or stage of
the river.
In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Nelson brought this
line closer to the normal or ordinary stage of the river.
[T] he true boundary line . . . is the line marked by
the permanent bed of the river by the flow of the water at its usual and accustomed stage, and where the
water will be found at all times in the season except
when diminished by drought or swollen by freshets.
This line will be found marked along its borders by
the almost constant presence and abrasion of the waters against the bank. It is always manifest to the eye
of any observer upon
a river, and is marked in a way
23
not to be mistaken.
Although this was generally more accurate,
line is "always manifest" is over-simplistic,
property rights are involved. It was left to
rence to develop a more practical and usable

the idea that the
especially where
the final concurdefinition.

Mr. Justice Curtis emphasized the importance of a line
which would "promote the convenience and advantage of the
parties" rather than any fixed line on the bank. To this end
he defined the line by reference to several ascertainable phy24
sical characteristics of the bank.
[The] line is to be found by examining the bed and
banks, and ascertaining where the presence and action
of water are so common and usual and so long continued in all ordinary years, as to mark upon the soil
of the bed a character distinct from that of the banks,
in respect to vegetation, as well as in respect to the
nature of the soil itself. Whether this line . .. will be
22. Id. at 415-16.

23. Id. at 424.
24. Id. at 427. It should be noted that Justice Curtis was here also referring to the
legal rule for interpretation of the language of the deed in the absence of the clear
intent of the parties.
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found above or below, or at a middle stage of water,
must depend upon the character of the stream. 5
Although the opinion speaks mainly of differences in the soil,
and the manner in which vegetation 26 relates to this difference, later cases 27 have distilled out soils and vegetation as
well as other related factors for more distinct treatment.
Before discussing those cases, it is helpful to delineate the
factors more fully. 28 It is important to note that unlike the

mean high water mark of tidal waters,2 9 the OHWL refers to
an observable physical mark caused by the action of water
upon the banks. 30 The OHWL represents the point at which
the water prevents the growth of terrestrial vegetation. 3 ' The
Curtis opinion pointed out that this test does not require the
absence of all vegetation, but only of terrestrialvegetation. 2
Obviously, a vegetation line may mark the division between
land-based and aquatic plant species. Another aspect of the
vegetation test emphasized by Justice Wayne is that it should
exclude from the bed land which is fit for agricultural purposes. 33 Probably more useful than the vegetation test in
most areas is the soil test.4 The OHWL represents the point
at which the character of the soil of the bank differs from
that of the upland. This includes surface markings, such as
erosion, shelving and litter, 5 as well as sub-surface-geological
characteristics.
25. Id.
26. The opinion emphasizes that the water may not necessarily denude the bed of vegetation, but that aquatic vegetation may exist there. The test requires an absence of
terrestrialvegetation. Id. at 428.
27. The subsequent decision of Alabama v. Georgia, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 505 (1860), involving the same boundary as in Howard v. Ingersoll attempted to clarify the definition. "[T]he bed of the river is that portion of its soil which is alternately covered and left bare, as there may be an increase or diminution in supply of water,
and which is adequate to contain it at its average and mean stage during the entire
year, without reference to the extra-ordinary freshets of the winter and spring, or
the extreme droughts of the summer or autumn." Id. at 515. As to the validity of
averaging to determine the OHWL, see the text accompanying notes 174 to 204.
28. Beyond their apparent legal significance, these factors have a great deal of importance with regard to the surveying effort. The convenience and accuracy of surveys
of the OHWL should be kept in mind in order to appreciate the utility, or lack
thereof, of the various factors.
29. See, Coastal Boundary Mapping, supra note 13, at 195-8.
30. See note 15, supra.
31. See note 26, supra; Hayes v. State, 496 S.W.2d 372 (Ark. 1973).
32. Howard v. Ingersoll, supra note 19, at 428.
33. Id. at 415-416.
34. See Borough of Ford City v. United States, 345 F.2d 645, 648 (3d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 902. "The vegetation test is useful where there is no clear, natural
line impressed on the bank. If there is a clear line, as shown by erosion, and other
easily recognized characteristics such as shelving, change in the character of the
soil, destruction of terrestrial vegetation, and litter, it determines the line of ordinary high water .... These are not really two separate tests but must, of necessity,
complement each other."
35. Id.
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The federal cases defining OHWL after Howard often involve the question of navigable servitude, 36 rather than the
physical limits of ownership. Under federal law, the bed beneath navigable waters is subject to an easement or servitude
in behalf of the government to maintain or improve navigability .3 Often-cited dictum in the opinion of Harrisonv. Fite "1
adopts the Howard definition for OHWL and applies it to the
question of the limit of the government's navigable servitude.
The bed of the river is that soil so usually covered by
water that it is wrested from vegetation and its value
for agricultural purposes is destroyed. It is the land
upon which the waters have visibly asserted their dominion, and does not extend to or include that upon
which grasses, shrubs, and trees grow, though covered
by the great annual rises.3
Thus, the orientation of the Ctirtis opinion toward the ascertainment of physical factors was ultimately adopted and
strengthened .4

Recent cases demonstrate some of the potential pitfalls in
applying this OHWL definition. In Borough of Ford City v.
United States" the question of damages caused to the city's
gravity-flow sewerage system by the construction of a dam
on the Allegheny River by the United States raised the issue
of the location of the OHWL before construction of the dam.
The District Court adopted the findings of Ford City's witness
who used the vegetation test exclusively, and appeared to
ignore three government witnesses who considered shelving,
erosion and litter, as well as vegetation, in setting the OHWL
36.

37.

38.
39.
40.
41.

See generally Martz, The Role of the Federal Government in State Water Law, 5
KAN. L. REV, 626 (1957); Sato, Water Resources Comments Upon the FederalState Relationship, 48 CAL. L. REV. 43 (1960); Trelease, Federal Limitations on
State Water Law, 10 BUFFALO L. REV. 399 (1961).
The case of United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. P. R.R. Co., 312 U.S. 592 (1941)
embodies the several principles of the servitude. It extends to the OHWL of a navigable stream. The bed is subject to the servitude regardless of who owns the bed,
and the government may take the land below the OHWL without payment of
compensation. If lands above the OHWL are taken, however, the owner of such uplands must receive just compensation. United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co.,
339 U.S. 799 (1950). But no compensation need be paid where the rights taken are
dependent on or derive their values from the flow of navigable waters, since ownership of the flow is already in the public. United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power
Co., 365 U.S. 624 (1961). See also United States v. Commodore Park, Inc., 324
U.S. 386, 390 (1945).
148 F. 781 (8th Cir. 1906).
The opinion cites a state court which follows Howard v. Ingersoll in this respect.
Id. at 783.
See also Paine Lumber Co. v. United States, 55 F. 854, 865 (E.D. Wis. 1893) (emphasizing the usefulness for agricultural purposes in charge to the jury).
345 F.2d 645 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 902 (1965).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1977

7

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 13 [1977], Iss. 2, Art. 5

472

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XIII

at a somewhat higher point. 2 According to the Court of Appeals, the initial problem was that the City's witness failed to
consider at what point the soil could not be used for agricultural purposes while at least one government witness did .13 In
applying the vegetation test of Harrison v. Fite, the court emphasized one aspect.
What the river or action of the water actually destroys
is the value of its soil for agricultural purposes. The
difference [between this and the general absence of
vegetation test] is vital here and generally and is readIt is merely a question of using the
ily discernible.
44
proper norm.
The court apparently did not recognize the practical difficulties inherent in a judgement of the "value for agricultural
purposes" of a given tract of land. 45 Fortunately, this apparent overemphasis of one aspect of the basic test has not been
strictly followed by later courts.
The case of Snake River Ranch v. United States46 demonstrates the difficulty in applying any one test of OHWL to all
navigable rivers in the country. 47 The court held in a quiet
title action by a private landowner, the Government had not
sustained its burden of proof in attempting to show gross
fraud or error in a meander line survey in that the meander
line was so divergent from the actual water boundary as to
manifest an intent not to delineate a water boundary. 48 The
difficulty was in the nature of the Snake River. Specifically,
[It] is characterized as braided, and has multiple interlacing flow patterns, during low periods, around
alluvial lands within its channel. The braiding is caused
by the carrying of a large sediment load on a steep
gradient at high velocity, eight feet per second in the
vicinity of the Snake River Ranch, which has resultwith
ed in the formation of a wide, shallow channel
either no clearly apparent thalweg . . .49 at a given
point in time or a shifting thalweg over time.5"
42.

Id. at 649-50.

43. Id. at 649.
44. Id. at 651
45. This is the type of judgment which would be difficult for a surveyor to make, for
example.

46. 395 F. Supp. 886 (D. Wyo. 1975).
47. See also Mot] v. Boyd, 286 S.W. 458. 469-70 (Tex. 1926).
48. Snake River Ranch v. United States, supra note 46, at 900.
49. This is defined as the point of deepest and most rapid flow. Id. at 893.
50.

Id.
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The court recognized the necessity for a departure from the
traditional definition of OHWL in such a situation.
The "mean high water mark" of the banks of the
main channel, while properly defined as the point of
separation between surrounding vegetation and the
water is more appropriately characterized on the
Snake River as the outer boundaries of the braided
channel that carries water during the substantial part
of the snowmelt high-flow period from May to September of most years. 51
The court apparently felt it was necessary to look beyond the
definition to the practicalities of the situation. Clearly, the
reasonable expectations of landowners would be that the
boundary extends to the spring limits of the bank. Further,
the public interest in the maintenance of navigability by the
sovereign owner of the bed favors such a result.
The case of Goose Creek Hunting Club, Inc. v. United
States52 provides a final illustration of the application of the
OHWL definition in the federal courts'. The United States had
constructed a dam on a navigable stream which was two waterbodies downstream from the plaintiff's land. That is, water
in the non-navigable stream on which the plaintiff's tract bordered flowed into a navigable stream that in turn flowed into
the stream upon which the dam was constructed .53 The result
was the permanent flooding of 110 acres of the plaintiff's
land which had previously been flooded only during the wet
season. 54 The court noted that the OHWL had been defined
in various ways by the federal courts: 55
[E] .g., as the line where that water stands sufficiently
long to destroy vegetation below it . . .;16 or, the line
below which the soil is so usually covered by water
that it is wrested from vegetation and its value for
agricultural purposes destroyed . . .;57 or as the line
below which the waters have so visibly asserted their
domain that terrestrial plant life ceases to grow and,
51.

Id. at 893. This case is a good one to demonstrate the types of factual analyses that
are necessary to determine the OHWL using physical characteristics as determinants.

52. 518 F.2d 579 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
53. Id. at 581-82.
54. Id. at 581.
55.
56.

Id. at 583.
Citing Kelly's Creek & Northwestern R.R. v. United States, 100 Ct. Cl. 396, 406
(1943).

57.

Citing Harrison v. Fite. 148 F. 781, 783 (8th Cir. 1906).
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therefore, the value for agricultural purposes is destroyed . . .;18 or as the line below which the soil is
kept practically bare of vegetation by the wash of the
waters of the river from year to year in their onward
course. 5 9
Yet whatever differences the court discerned in these definitions, by any of them the land in question was above the
OHWL 60 and not subject to the navigational servitude of the
government. 6 1 In particular the opinion noted that the land
was "covered with good grass during the dry season" and
contained several species of terrestrial trees, among them willows, bitter pecan, and overcup oak trees.6 2 The court gave
the plaintiff a judgement for damages for the property taken .63

A number of state courts6 4 have put their stamp of approval
upon the traditional definition of the OHWL. One of the
leading cases is Diana Shooting Club v. Husting,65 where the
owner of the upland6 6 sued a hunter who had rowed his boat
into the wild aquatic vegetation at the edge of a navigable
river. The court adopted a fairly broad definition of OHWL:
By ordinary high water mark is meant the point on
the bank or shore up to which the presence and action of the water is so continuous as to leave a distinct
mark either by erosion, destruction of terrestrial67 vegetation, or other easily recognized characteristic.
The definition was held to apply whether the waters be deep
or shallow, clear or covered with vegetation,6 8 and in this case
to preclude the trespass action.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

64.

Citing Borough of Ford City v. United States, 345 F.2d 645, 648 (3d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 902 (1965).
Citing Oklahoma v. Texas, 260 U.S. 606. 632 (1923).
Goose Creek Hunting Club, Inc. v. United States, supra note 52, at 583-84.
Id. at 583.
Id. at 584.
Id. On its demands for the determination of damages the court made a very interesting determination. It held that since 49 acres of land above the 110 which were
clearly inundated would be "permanently damaged" because of the raised water
table, damages, would lie for these acres as well.
See, eg., Tilden v. Smith, 113 So. 708 (Fla. 1927); Sun Dial Ranch v. May Land
Co., 119 P. 758 (Ore. 1912), which quoted 2 FARNHAM, WATER AND WATER

RIGHTS § 417 for the traditional definition taken from Howard v. Ingersoll.
65. 145 N.W. 816 (Wis. 1914).
66. Here the owner of the upland also had a valid exclusive lease of the bed of the river
in the area of the alleged trespass. In Wisconsin the beds of navigable rivers are privately owned subject to the public right of navigation and rights incident thereto.

Id.
67. Id. at 820.
68.

Id.
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It is important to note that it would be impractical and
unrealistic to strictly apply the OHWL definition where the
situation calls for some departure. The state courts have followed the lead of the Snake River Ranch court in the avoidance of ridiculous results through flexible application of the
definition. Certainly the presence or absence of vegetation is
not always conclusive. The Iowa Supreme Court stated in
State v. Sorenson,69 for example, that large trees may sometimes continue to grow although covered with water at their
bottoms for some period. The court relied on the testimony
of a botany expert that trees of the size and character involved
could easily have gained a foothold and grown below the
OHWL notwithstanding the fact that small vegetation could
not grow there. 0 This and other cases7 ' imply the converse
as well. That is, even where aquatic vegetation is found some
distance inland, in marshland or other poorly drained areas,
for example, the finding of a realistic OHWL should not be
upset.
As noted above, most state courts addressing the problem 72 have simply adopted word for word the definition of
Justice Curtis in Howard v. Ingersoll. State v. Bonelli Cattle
Co., 73 a case which was reversed on other grounds 4 which
will be discussed later, 5 conforms to this pattern. In holding
that the state rule regarding avulsion applied to vest in Arizona
title to land exposed as a result of a federal channelization
project, the opinion adopted the Curtis statement of the definition. 76 In addition the court attempted a clarification.
[Ordinary high-water mark] is not the line reached
by unusual floods, but it is the line to which high water ordinarily reaches. "High-water mark" means what
its language imports-a water mark. It is co-ordinate
with the limit of the bed of the water, and that only
is to be considered the bed which the water occupies
sufficiently long and continuously to wrest it from
69. 271 N.W. 234 (Iowa 1937).
70. Id. at 236-7.
71. See, e.g., Hayes v. State, 496 S.W. 2d 372 (Ark. 1973).
72. This article does not purport to analyze even a small fraction of these state court
cases. Particularly instructive are the recent decisions in Belmont v. Umpqua Sand
and Gravel, Inc., 542 P.2d 884 (Ore. 1975); Hayes v. State, 496 S.W.2d 372 (Ark.
1973); Dep't of Nat. Resources v. Pankratz 538 P.2d 984 (Alas. 1975).
73. 108 Ariz. 258, 495 P.2d 1312 (1972).
74. Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973).
75. See text accompanying notes 96 to 107, infra.
76. State v. Bonelli Cattle Co., supra note 73, at 1314.
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vegetation, and destroy its value for agricultural pur-

poses .7
This emphasis on physical markings has been reinforced by
usage in other state courts. In Florida, the OHWL was expressly defined in Tilden v. Smith,78 adopting language from a
Minnesota opinion, Carpenterv. Hennepin County' 9
[The] high-water mark, as a line between a riparian
owner and the public, is to be determined by examining the bed and banks, and ascertaining where the
presence and action of the water are so common and
usual, and so long continued in all ordinary years, as
to mark upon the soil of the bed a characterdistinct
from that of the banks, in respect to vegetation, as
well as respects the nature of the soil itself. "Highwater mark" means what its language imports-a water mark .8
Thus, it appears that most state definitions conform substantially with each other and federal law on the definition of the
OHWL.
DOES FEDERAL COMMON LAW CONTROL THE
DEFINITION OF THE OWHL?
It appears from the previous discussion that the federal
and state definitions of OHWL are all derived from the same
source and, thus, are substantially the same. However, the
question of whether federal common law controls is an important one for several reasons. Under some circumstances
the state might think it desirable to fix the line relative to
some point in time. 81 Moreover, the definition of OHWL
carries with it a number of corollary property concepts related to accretion, reliction and avulsion. If the federal courts
retain jurisdiction over these matters in all cases, it would
mean that the extent of basic property rights, traditionally
left to the states for determination, would be litigated at the
federal level.82 Although these substantive issues are dis77. Id.
78. 113 So. 708 (Fla. 1927). It should be noted that the Tilden court was not called
upon to define the limits of sovereignty lands. However, it is fairly clear that the
definition given was intended to cover title questions as well. Id. at 711.
79. 56 Minn. 513, 58 N.W. 295 (1894).
80. Tilden v. Smith, supra note 78, at 712 (emphasis in original).
81.

See, eg., FLA. STAT. § 253.151 (3) (a) (1975); State v. Florida National Properties,

Inc., 338 So.2d 13 (Fla. 1976): United States v. Washington, 294 F.2d 830 (9th
Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 817 (1962).
82. See generally Note, Artificial Additions to Riparian Land: Accretion, 14 ARIZ. L.
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cussed later in this article, 83 it is necessary at the threshold
to attempt to delineate the circumstances under which federal
law has been held to control their determination. Obviously,
if the federal definition controls, the question of what the
states can do to clarify their own definitions is wholly academic .84
The landmark case of Borax Consolidated, Ltd. v. Los
Angeles8 set forth the rule that federal law would apply to
determine tidal boundaries where a federal question was involved. In that case the upland owner, Borax, received title
through a federal patent to its predecessors. As to'whether
this situation called for the application of federal common
law the Supreme Court declared:
The question as to the extent of this federal grant,
that is, as to the limit of the land conveyed, or the
boundary between the upland and the tideland, is
necessarily a federal question. It is a question which
concerns the validity and effect of an act done by the
United States; it involves the ascertainment of the essential basis of a right asserted under federal law.8 6
This principle was subsequently applied to accretion in the
Washington and Hughes cases discussed below.
United States v. Washington87 concerned the ownership
of accretions to littoral land owned by the federal' government along the coast of Washington. The primary issue was
whether state or federal law applied. It was argued that federal law followed the common law position and recognized
the ambulatory nature of tidal boundaries. Under state law,
however, the boundary was fixed as of the date of statehood,
and subsequent accretions were owned by the state rather
than the littoral owner.
The federal court of appeals, reversing the trial court,
held that the Borax case was controlling and declared that,
REV. 315 (1972); Comment, Federal Common Law Determines Ownership of ReExposed Navigable River Beds, 50 WASH. L. REV. 777 (1975); Young, Riparian
Owner, Not State, Owns Bed Deserted by River, 60 A.B.A.J. 221 (1974).
See
the discussion regarding "The Necessity of an Ambulatory Line" beginning at
83.
p. 493, infra.
84. The Florida National Properties case, infra, which declared Florida's boundary statute unconstitutional, illustrates this point. See text at pages 493-94 for an analysis
of the present status of this opinion.
85. 296 U.S. 10 (1935).

86. Id. at 22.
87.

294 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 817 (1962).
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accordingly, federal law would prevail over state law. The
court stated that, while Borax had not been directly concerned
with accretion, the principle of that case is equally applicable
because accretion is an attribute of title and "the determination of the attributes of an underlying federal title, quite as
much as the determination of the boundaries of the land reserved or acquired under such a title, 'involves the ascertainment of the essential basis of a right asserted under federal
law.' "88
The rule in the Washington case was reaffirmed several
years later by the Supreme Court in Hughes v. Washington. 89
The issue involved whether the plaintiff, successor in title to
an original federal grantee, was entitled to the gradual and
imperceptible accretions added to her land both before and
after the admission of Washington to the Union. The state
trial court, relying upon the Borax and Washington decisions,
held that federal law applied and confirmed title to the accreted lands in the plaintiff. The State supreme court, however, reversed, declaring that state rather than federal law
governed in this instance. Since under the law of Washington
the boundary was fixed as of the date of statehood, the court
held that all accretions since that time belonged to the state
rather than the littoral owner.
The case was then brought before the United States Supreme Court. The issue before the Court was whether or not
a state could alter the ambulatory boundary between its tidelands and uplands patented by the federal government prior
to statehood by declaring that boundary to be permanently
fixed at the line of ordinary high tide on the date of admission to statehood, thereby depriving the uplands owner of
natural accretions occurring since that date. The Supreme
Court held that this question was controlled by federal law,
not state law and, therefore, the littoral owner was entitled to the accretions. The Court relied on the Borax case to
reach its decision: "While the issue appears never to have
been squarely presented to this Court before, we think the
path to decision is indicated by our holding in Borax, Ltd. v.
No subsequent case in this Court has cast
Los Angeles ....
88. Id. at 832.
89. 389 U.S. 290 (1967).
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doubt on the principle announced in Borax. "9 The Court
reached its decision in spite of the fact that the Borax case did
not deal with accretions. It nevertheless declared:
While this is true, the case did involve the question as
to what rights were conveyed by the federal grant and
decided that the extent of ownership under the federal grant is governed by federal law. This is as true
whether doubt as to any boundary is based on a broad
question as to the general definition of the shoreline
or on a particularized problem relating to the ownership of accretion 1
The right asserted by Mrs. Hughes, whose predecessor in
title had acquired the upland before statehood, was a right asserted under federal law. Under federal law accretion belonged
to the upland owner. The main policy behind the federal
common law was to protect the riparian owners' access to the
water.92 Therefore, the accretion to Mrs. Hughes' property
belonged to her, and not to the state. In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Stewart recognized Washington's fixed
boundary rule as a change in the state's water law. He argued
that Mrs. Hughes' right to accretion should be based on the
principle that the application of state law was a taking of
property without compensation. 3
Thus, both the Washington and the Hughes cases recognized the ambulatory boundary as a part of the federal law
and held that this principle would prevail over a contrary
state rule. While Hughes involved a federal patent made prior
to statehood, both Washington and Borax involved patents
made after statehood. These decisions would therefore suggest that federal law will govern wherever a federal patent is
involved. This would virtually destroy the efficacy of any
state law that attempted to establish a fixed boundary as far
as those states carved out of the federal domain are concerned, 94 including well over half of the coastline of the
United States. The validity of these decisions, at least as they
might have applied to inland non-tidal navigable water bodies,
is now in question, however, since the rendering of a very
90. Id. at 291-92.
91.

Id. at 292.

92. Id. at 293.
93. Id. at 294-98.
94.

Note, Florida Sovereignty Submerged Lands: What Are they, Who Owns Them
and Where Is the Boundary?, 1 FLA. ST. L. REV. 596, 630 (1973).
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recent United States Supreme Court decision to be discussed
later, Oregon v. Corvallis Sand and Gravel Co. 9
Another decision by the Supreme Court, Bonelli Cattle
Co. v. Arizona 6 further extended the applicability of federal
common law when the Court took the position that when
states are successors in title to the federal government, they
are subject to federal common law with respect to boundaries
of land abutting on all navigable waters. Bonelli involved a
dispute between an upland owner and the State of Arizona,
as owner of the bed of the Colorado River, over title to land
exposed by rechanneling the river. The Arizona Supreme
Court considered the exposed land to be the result of avulsion
since a sudden change in the character of the land was involved, and held that title to the exposed land remained in
the State. 97 The Supreme Court of the United States reversed.
Although urged to apply the Hughes analysis-that a federal
question was involved because the upland owner traced his
title through a federal grant-the Court sidestepped this argument 8 in favor of a broader rationale.99 A federal question
was involved, the Court reasoned, because the State acquired
its title to the riverbed under the equal footing doctrine.°10 Further, the State's title was held to be a limited one in that it
held the beds of navigable waters for the purpose of public
navigation. 1 ' In cases in which the channeling project enhanced the state's interest in the navigability of the river, the
Court decided that as a matter of public policy the State
should not be permitted to acquire the exposed land in what
would amount to a "windfall, since unnecessary to the State's
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

-U.S.

,

97 S.Ct. 582 (1977).

414 U.S. 313 (1973).
State v. Bonelli Cattle Co., 107 Ariz. 465, 489 P.2d 699 (1971).
"[I] t is unclear whether at the time of Santa Fe Pacific's patent, the portion of the
land which ultimately became Bonelli's parcel was actually riparian." Bonelli Cattle
Co. v. Arizona, supra note 96, at 321 n. 11.
The court made an important distinction between questions of riparian rights
granted by the states in sovereignty beds (determined by state law said the court),
and questions of the extent of state ownership of sovereign lands (determined by
federal common law). "We continue to adhere to the principle that it is left to the
states to determine the rights of riparian owners in the beds of navigable streams
which, under federal law, belong to the State . . .The issue before us is not what
rights the state has accorded private owners in lands which the state holds as sovereign right; but, rather, how far the State's sovereign right extends under the equal-

footing doctrine ... "Id. at 319.
100.

101.

The states which entered the Union after its formation were admitted with the
same rights as the original states within their respective borders. Mumford v. Wardwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 423 (1867). Title to lands under navigable waters passed to
the new states under the equal footing doctrine. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S.
(3 How.) 212 (1845).
Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, supra note 96, at 322-23.
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purpose in holding title to the beds of the navigable streams
within its borders."' 10 To avoid. this windfall to the State,
which would have resulted from classifying the drying up of
the bottomlands as avulsion, the Court in effect redefined
avulsion and accretion, no longer emphasizing the speed with
which the change was brought about, but rather finding accretion because of the lack of "navigational or related public
purposes."'' 0 Lack of such interests, said the Court, called
for application of the accretion theory, which gave the land
to Bonelli, the adjoining landowner.
Obviously the holding of Bonelli implied far-reaching
consequences. The majority apparently intended through use
of the equal footing doctrine to broaden the applicability of
federal common law under Borax beyond those relatively
limited'04 lands to which title derived from a federal patent.
Under the equal footing rationale the only submerged sovereignty land that would be excepted would be that under
navigable waters situated in the original thirteen states and
Texas, where the federal government was not the source of
title. It was this seemingly irrational exclusion against which
Mr. Justice Stewart dissented."'5 The impact of the decision
was to shift the basis of the holding that federal law applies
when there is a finding that title to the upland derived from a
federal grant 1 6 to a determination of the extent of state interests in sovereignty land under the equal footing doctrine. 10 7 The effect was to require an analytical focus on the
extent of sovereignty land as a federal question, rather than
on the extent of riparian land.
Despite the fact that Bonelli was so recently decided and
by a seven-to-one majority, its treatment of the equal footing
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 328.
Id. at 329.
The Borax rule was relatively limited in that it apparently applied only to those
states carved out of the federal domain.
The upshot of the
105. "I think this ruling emasculates the equal footing doctrine ...
Court's decision is that the 13 Original States are free to develop and apply their
own rules of property law for the resolution of conflicting claims to an exposed
bed of a river, while those States admitted after the Constitution's ratification must
under today's decision knuckle under to this court's supervisory view of 'federal
common law.' A later-admitted State like Arizona is thus not at all on an equal
footing with the original States in the exercise of sovereignty over real property
within its boundaries." Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona. supra note 96, at 336.
106. Borax Consolidated, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 (1935); United States v.
Washington, 294 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 817 (1962);
Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290 (1967).
107. 414 U.S. at 321 n.l. See note 100, supra.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1977

17

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 13 [1977], Iss. 2, Art. 5

482

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XIII

doctrine as a source of federal common law has been expressly overruled by Oregon v. Corvallis Sand and Gravel Co. 108
Corvallis concerned a complicated situation involving a "cutoff" formed during a flood of the Willamette River in Oregon.
During the flood a wide bend in the main channel of the
river became a secondary branch when the force of the water
cut across the neck of the peninsula formed by the bend. 109
Corvallis Sand had been excavating in the new riverbed for
forty to fifty years without a lease from the State. The State
brought an ejectment action against Corvallis to recover eleven
parcels of riverbed as well as damages for the use of the parcels. The trial court awarded parcels to each party and set
damages for previous use by Corvallis of parcels awarded to
the State.11 Both parties appealed from that court to the
Oregon Court of Appeals. The question there was whether
the landowners in the area of the cut retained title under
avulsion theory, or whether the. title reverted to the State. In
a sense, the issue was whether Bonelli could be applied in reverse."' The Oregon Court of Appeals clearly held that
Bonelli required the application of federal law to determine
whether the change was avulsive.ln
Arizona, dissatisfied with the decisions of its own courts,
successfully carried its case to the United States Supreme
Court on petition for certiorari. The Court's opinion was delivered by Mr. Justice Rehnquist.
Our analysis today leads us to conclude that our decision to apply federal common law in Bonelli was inAlthough federal law may fix the initial
correct ....
boundary between fast lands and the riverbeds at the
time of admission to the Union, the State's title to
the riverbed vests absolutely as of the time of a State's
admission and is not subject to later defeasance by
operation of any doctrine of federal common law." 3
The Court, then, elaborated upon the proper scope and effect
of the equal footing doctrine.
108. 429 U.S. 363 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Corvallis]
109. Oregon v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 526 P.2d 469, 473-74 (Ore. Ct. App. 1974).
110.
111.

112.

113.

Id. at 472.
"While Bonelii involved title to lands formerly under the main channel that had
since become dry, the basic public policy discussion is equally applicable to the
case where certain lands which were not under water are presently under water."
Id. at 475.
"The State relies heavily upon Purvine v. Hathaway 238 Or. 60, 393 P.2d 181
(1964), to support its position that this change was not avulsive in nature. First, it
should be noted that federal common law controls ownership questions under
Bonelli, and thus, state cases are of limited applicability," Id. at 476 n.5.
Corvallis, supra note 108, at 370-71. (emphasis added).
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Once the equal footing doctrine had vested title to
the riverbed in Arizona as of the time of its admission
to the Union, the force of that doctrine was spent; it
did not operate after that date to determine what effect on titles the movement of the river might have.
Our error, as we now see it, was to view the equal
footing doctrine enunciated in Pollard's Lessee v.
Hagan as a basis upon which federal common law
of
could supercede state law in the determination
4
land titles. Precisely the contrary is true."
Thus, the Bonelli decision's broadening of the applicability of
federal common law beyond the holding in Borax by use of
the equal footing doctrine is no longer valid.
The origin and development of the equal footing doctrine
required that the Bonelli interpretation be undone. In 1845,
the Supreme Court held in Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan"5 that
new states joining the Union were entitled to the soil under
navigable waters within the state, which had not previously
been conveyed, just as were the original thirteen states upon
forming the new nation. The rule in Pollard's Lessee was reaffirmed in Weber v. Harbor Commissioners"6 which held
that California entered the Union as sovereign over all its soils
under tidewater within its borders with the right to dispose
of such title in any manner considered proper, subject only
to the federal government's paramount authority over navigation to facilitate foreign and interstate commerce. In 1891,
Packer v. Bird"' was decided, holding that the high water
mark constituted the limit below which the United States
could not convey lands bordering navigable waters because
such lands belong to the state under the equal footing doctrine. Importantly, the Packer Court went on to rule that
while state law could not define the boundaries of a federal
grant nor impair the use and enjoyment of that property,
state law was determinative as to the rights attached to the
property conveyed." 8
The Bonelli expansion of the equal footing doctrine to
make federal common law applicable to determine disputed
114. Id. at 371.
115. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 391 (1845).
116. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 57 (1873).
117. 137 U.S. 661 (1891).
118. Id. at 672.
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inland navigable water boundaries created an inequality between the original thirteen states and Texas, whose source of
title was not the federal government, and all other states in
the Union. This interpretation was contrary to the very
meaning of "equal footing" and the notion that new states
were admitted to the Union on an equal basis with the original thirteen states which included equality in the exercise of
sovereignty over the beds of navigable waters. The Corvallis
decision has put the "equal" back into the equal footing doctrine as it was envisioned by the Supreme Court in Pollard's
Lessee.
In addition to ruling that federal common law must be
applied to resolve disputed inland navigable water boundaries,
the Bonelli decision fashioned a new federal law of accretion
under which courts were to balance the state's interest in navigational and related public interests 9 against the traditional
principles for determining ambulatory boundaries. 12 0 The
Bonelli court tied sovereign ownership of the beds of nontidal navigable waterbodies to the purposes underlying the
public trust doctrine. When those purposes were determined
not to exist in the circumstances under consideration, ownership of the bed by the State was no longer thought essential. 121 Carrying this to its logical extreme would arguably
mean that a state need not own the beds of any navigable waterbody within its jurisdiction. A navigable servitude would
be enough to protect the public interest in such lands. 22 The
119.

The Court would apparently approve an expansive definition of related public in-

terests. "The extent of the State's interests should not be narrowly constructed because it is demonstrated a navigational purpose" Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona.
supra note 96, at 323 n.15 (Citing Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970),
120.

cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971) ).
The Bonelli court analyzed the policies behind accretion and reliction: "There are
a number of interrelated reasons for the application of the doctrine of accretion.
First, where lands are bounded by water, it may well be regarded as the expectancy
of the riparian owners that they should continue to be so bounded. Second, the
quality of being riparian, especially to navigable water, may be the land's 'most
valuable feature' and is part and parcel of the ownership of land itself. Hughes v.

Washington, 389 U.S. at 293; Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497, 504 (1871). Riparianness also encompasses the vested right to future alluvion, which is an 'essential attribute of the original property.' County of St. Clair v. Lovington, 23 Wall.
46.68 (1874). By requiring that the upland owner suffer the burden of erosion and
by giving him the benefit of accretions, riparianness is maintained. Finally, there is
a compensation theory at work. Riparian land is at the mercy of the wanderings of
the river. Since a riparian owner is subject to losing the land by erosion beyond his
control, he should benefit from any addition to his lands by the accretions thereto
which are equally beyond his control." Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, supra note

121.

96, at 326.
"Since the State asserts no public need for ownership of the subject land we do not

122.

attempt to define the exact parameters of the permissible public purpose." See
note 119, supra.
Obviously this would not be enough in many circumstances. If the bed is in private
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Corvallis opinion, in expressly overruling the equal footing
doctrine as a basis for applying federal law, makes it unnecessary for the states to adopt this balancing of interests approach formulated in Bonelli. Title determinations to lands
bordering navigable non-tidal waters in those states which
joined the Union under the equal footing doctrine are now
controlled by state law. A state could, however, choose to
follow the principle enunciated in Bonelli, that when a state
changes the course of a waterbody or lowers water levels so
that formerly submerged lands are exposed and no navigationrelated public goals remain in the exposed lands, the exposure
will be treated as accretion with a resultant transferring of
title to the accreted lands to the adjacent riparian owners.
The significance of the Corvallis decision is that the application of the Bonelli principle is no longer requiredof the states.
That much of the Supreme Court's opinion seems clear. Not
so clear, however, is the effect of Corvallis on the principle
enunciated in Hughes-that federal common law governs
boundary disputes involving lands whose title derived from a
prior federal patent.
In the words of Mr. Justice Marshall, dissenting from the
Corvallis majority opinion.
The Court holds that federal common law governs
only the determination of the initial boundaries of
the grant; all other questions are to be determined
under state law. 1'
Such a holding would constitute a return to the limited principle originally pronounced in Borax that federal law will
govern the determination of the boundary that demarks the
extent of a grant as originally conveyed by the United States,
and a retreat from Hughes' expansion of Borax to make federal law equally applicable to the resolution of title disputes
to lands added by the process of accretion to the original federal grant.'21 4 More significantly, Corvallis seems to implicitly
ownership the state's authority to control the taking of minerals, etc. from the bed
is severely diminished. If there is any lesson to be learned from recent environmental skirmishes, it is that state ownership allows for flexibility of alternatives while
private ownership does not. Clearly, it would be a mistake to irrevocably fix the interests of the public in this manner.
123. Corvallis, supra note 108, at 385.
124. "[A]s the Court is certain to announce when the occasion arises, today's holding
also overrules Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290 (1967)." Id. at 593 (Dissenting
Opinion, Marshall, J.).
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reject the whole idea that the existence of a federal source of
title will constitute a proper basis upon which to apply federal common law to non-tidal navigable water boundary disputes. After rejecting Bonelli's novel application of the equal
footing doctrine, the Corvallis majority observed that the
only other basis for applying federal law in that case was the
fact the Bonelli's property was part of a conveyance previously patented to the Santa Fe Railroad by the federal government. The Court found this second basis equally deficient to
justify superceding Arizona's own law because the land in
question "had long been in private ownership and, hence, under the great weight of precedent from [the United States Supreme Court], subject to the general body -of state property
law."'12 5 This perfunctory language, without elaboration by,
the majority, might be explained by the Supreme Court's decision in Corvallis not to reconsider Hughes, since that case
had not been cited by the Oregon courts nor relied upon in
Bonelli." 6 It is obvious that reconsideration of Bonelli's use
of the equal footing doctrine as a basis for applying federal
law to inland navigable water boundary disputes was the focus of the Corvallis opinion. Nevertheless, there are comments
in the Corvallis opinion that clearly suggest the existence of a
prior federal patent does not require application of federal
common law and, therefore, that the holding in Hughes has
been implicitly overruled in this respect.
In the first place, as discussed above, the majority of the
Court concluded that it was wrong to have applied federal
law in Bonelli--not merely that the equal footing doctrine
was inapplicable to justify its use. Secondly, after elaborating
upon the proper scope of the equal footing doctrine, the Corvallis Court stated:
Thus, if the lands at issue did pass under the equal
footing doctrine, state title is not subject to defeasance and state law governs subsequent dispositions. A
similar result obtains in the case of riparian lands
1 2
which did not pass under the equal footing doctrine.
Use of this broad language is another indication by the Court
125. Id. at 587, citing Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 U.S. (13 Pet.) 266 (1839). In his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall found Wilcox unsupportive of the majority's position. Id. at 595-96.

126.

Id. at 377 n.6.

127.

Id. at 378.
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that the existence of a prior federal grant would not alter the
necessity for state law to control the boundary determination. Finally, the majority's rejection of Hughes was implied
when it cited the case of Joy v. City of St. Louis' 2 for the
proposition that a claim to accretions to land patented to
one's predecessor by the federal government was not a basis
129
for the application of federal common law.
We also think there was no other basis [besides the
equal footing doctrine] in that case [Bonelli], nor is
there any in this case, to support the application of
federal common law to override state real property
law. 130
Thus, while prior to the rendering of the Supreme Court's
decision in Corvallis, federal law likely would have governed
whenever a federal patent was involved based upon the holdings in the Washington and Hughes cases, that would seem to
no longer hold true. The Supreme Court appears to embrace
again the language of its older decisions. 131 Corvallis does suggest, however, that Hughes may still control title determinations in regard to lands bordering the ocean due to the "vital
interest" of the federal government in the marginal sea.
We are aware of the fact that Hughes gave to Borax
the same sort of expansive construction as did Bonelli,
but we are likewise aware that Hughes dealt with
ocean-front property, a fact which the Court thought
sufficiently different from the usual situation so as to
justify a "federal common law" rule of riparian proprietorship.l3
Disputes involving the nation's coastline would thus be resolved by application of the federal common law of ambulatory boundaries and this would seem to hold true despite the
absence of a federal patent in the chain of title and notwithstanding a state's participation in any such boundary controversy. The majority of the Court in Corvallis, by their reference to Hughes as being distinguishable because of its ocean128.
129.
130.
131.

201 U.S. 332, 343 (1906).
Corvallis, supra note 108, at 377.
Id. at 381.
E.g., "In our judgement the grants of the government for lands bounded on streams
and other waters, without any reservation or restriction of terms, are to be construed as to their effect according to the law of the state in which the lands lie."
Hardin v. Jordon, 140 U.S. 371, 38.4 (1891).
132. Corvallis, supra note 108, at 377 n.6.
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front property context, has seemingly broadened the Hughes
precedent for the application of federal law. Instead of merely standing for the application of federal law to determine
title to lands added by accretion to ocean-front property derived from a federal patent, the Hughes decision has arguably
been extended to support the application of federal law to
determine title boundaries on all coastal waters-the prior
federal patent element of the holding having been exorcised.
Since the decision in Corvallis, a federal district court in
Iowa has rendered an opinion which lends further support to
the proposition that state law will control the resolution of
boundary disputes involving inland navigable waters. 13 3 The
United States, as trustee for the Omaha Indian Tribe, brought
suit to establish title to lands bordering the Missouri River--a
determination that required the court to decide whether the
movement of the River over a span of one hundred years had
resulted in accretion to the riparian properties of the defendants or had been an avulsive movement which might have
placed title in the Omaha Indian Tribe. In holding that state
law governed, 134 the court began by citing Joy v. City of St.
Louis'35 for the general proposition that state law is applicable to determine not only title to lands within its jurisdiction, but "questions concerning the rights of riparian landowners to accretion lands" as well. 1' As to whether the fact
that the United States as claimant to the land involved created an exception to this general rule, the court expressly held
that it did not.137 Hughes v. Washington"38 was distinguished, 3 9 as it was in Corvallis, as limited to ocean-front
property involving the nation's international boundaries 4
133.
134.

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

United States v. Wilson, 433 F. Supp. 57 (N.D. Iowa 1977).
In this case, Nebraska law was applied on the authority of Nebraska v. Iowa, 406
U.S. 117 (1972). "The 1972 Nebraska-Iowa case began when Iowa claimed thirty
separate parcels which were wholly on the Iowa Side of the 1943 compact line.
For purposes of resolving the choice of law issues, the Court divided the. thirty par-

cels into two groups. The classification was based on whether the land in the parcels was formed before or after 1943 . . . Nebraska law would provide the rule of
decision for land disputes as to river changes occuring prior to 1943, and Iowa law
would provide the rule of decision for changes occuring after that date." Id. at 60.
201 U.S. 332 (1906).
Wilson,supra note 133, at 59.
Id. at 61 citing Mason v. United States, 260 U.S. 545 (1923); United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., Inc., 412 U.S. 580, 595 (1973); 14 WRIGHT, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 141 n.4 (1976).
389 U.S. 290 (1967).
Wilson,supra note 133, at 61.
"In any event, Hughes was concerned only with the question whether a title included accretion lands deposited subsequent to issuance of a patent, not whether accretion had in fact occurred." Wilson, supra note 133, at 61 n.3.
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The court then turned to a rationale not utilized in the
cases previously discussed:
Under the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652,141
the Constitution, treaties and Acts of Congress must
be examined in each case to determine whether fed42
eral law supplants state law as the rule of decision.
After examining these sources to ascertain whether the application of federal law was required by any of them, the court
found that no such requirement existed and there was no
"federal policy broad or strong enough to supplant the strong
local policy concerning title to land." 143 The district court,
in effect, found that the existence of a prior federal patent
does not mandate the application of federal common law to
resolve boundary disputes involving non-tidal navigable waterbodies either as a federal decisional principle or under the
authority of the Rules of Decision Act. Additionally, the special circumstance of the federal government's paramount interest in the nation's international boundaries reappears in
dicta in Wilson as the justification for federal law to control
in cases involving coastal waters.
USE OF THE MEANDER LINE AS
AN ALTERNATIVE BOUNDARY
In a few exceptional cases, the meander line has been designated the boundary separating publicly-owned submerged
lands from private upland ownership. Most of these cases involved disputes over boundaries of tidal waters but one notable case that will be discussed, Utah v. United States,144 concerned the Great Salt Lake. Because it is conceivable that the
meander line may be urged as an alternative boundary when
the location of the OHWL is in dispute, these cases are worth
examining here.
Meander lines are established by public survey and were
traditionally determined by the surveyor actually walking
around the shoreline of a navigable body of water to record a
141.

"The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the
United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as
rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where
they apply."

142. Wilson,supra note 133, at 61.
143. Id. at 62.
144.

425 U.S. 948 (1976); see Report of Special Master reproduced in 1976 UTAH L.
REV. 245.
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line which purportedly followed the sinuosities of the
shore 1 The meander line of a particular piece of land will
be a straight line or a series of straight lines connecting points
or monuments on the shore for use in determining the quan4 6 It has
tity of public land in the subdivision being surveyed.1
14
that unless a clear intent to
been held in innumerable cases
make the meander line the boundary is shown,'4 8 it is not the
proper line of demarcation for title purposes, but the water
whose margin is meandered is the true boundary. Courts have,
nevertheless, occasionally declared the meander line to be the
property boundary where the water line was obscured in
some way.
In Trustees of Internal Improvement Fund v. Wetstone, 149
involving an island meandered under an original government
patent, the Florida Supreme Court reasoned that it was the
State's duty to establish the boundary between private and
sovereignty lands. When the State failed to present any evidence as to the location of the mean high water line in an
area of dense mangrove growth, the Florida high court accepted the meander line as the boundary. 5 0° Hawkins v. Alaska Freight Lines, Inc.,151 was a trespass case in which the
meander line was presumed to substantially indicate a mean
high water line obscured by fill and road construction 52 The
145.
146.
147.
148.

149.
150.

151.
152.

See generally U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SURVEY OF THE PUBLIC LANDS OF THE UNITED STATES
(1902).
Den v. Spaldinw. 39 Cal. App.2d 623. 625. 104 P.2d 81, 83 (1st Dist. Ct. App.
1940). See also 2 SHALOW1TZ, SHORE AND SEA BOUNDARIES 89 (1962).
E.g., Whitaker v. McBride, 197 U.S. 510 (1905); Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371
(1891); Jeffry v. Grosvenor, 261 Iowa 1052, 157 N.W.2d 114 (1968); Narrows
Realty Co. v. State, 52 Wash.2d 843, 329 P.2d 836 (1958).
Mitchell v. Smale, 140 U.S. 406, 414 (1891); Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 380
(1891). The general statement of the rule is that "a meander line may constitute a
boundary where so intended or where the discrepancies between the meander line
and the ordinary high water line leave an excess of unsurveyed land so great as
clearly and palpably to indicate fraud or mistake." Lopez v. Smith, 145 So.2d 509,
515 (Fla. 1962); cf. Udall v. Oelschlaeger, 389 F.2d 974 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Where
the federal government refused to approve plaintiff's application for a patent under
federal homestead legislation, claiming that the land in question had previously
been withdrawn from entry by a Department of Interior Public Land Order which
purported to, withdraw frcm appropriation an area "parallel to and one mile distant from the line of mean high tide of Turnagin Arm", a tidal inlet. The Interior
Department construed "the line of mean high tide" to mean the meander line and
the Court of Appeals held that the Department's interpretation was controlling for
identifying the lands affected by its withdrawal order as long as that interpretation
was not plainly unreasonable or unauthorized). 389 F.2d at 976.
222 So.2d 10 (Fla. 1969).
The State, in fact, offered no evidence as to the boundary line. Id. at 11. Pointing
out that the meander line was in places several hundred feet offshore in navigable
waters, the dissent argued that the State had no authority to convey sovereignty
lands except in the public interest. Id. at 14-19.
410 P.2d 992 (Alas. 1966).
The purpose of the presumption was to determine whether a trespass had occurred
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Alaska court, however, did not intend that the meander line
would be presumed the boundary for title purposes.
In 1966 the State of Utah brought an action within the
original jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court to
obtain a judicial determination of the proper boundary separating state and federal landholdings surrounding the Great
Salt Lake. A Special Master was appointed in 1972 to conduct proceedings and submit reports to the Court. 153 The'
Special Master's first report, recommending that the doctrine
of reliction not be applied to the Great Salt Lake, was adopted in 1975.154 In a second report, the Special Master recommended that the meander line be designated the boundary
between the State's submerged lands and the federal uplands
surrounding the Lake. The Supreme Court subsequently adopted this second report also. 5
The parties to) the proceedings both stipulated that the
ordinary high water mark is the legal measure of the bed of
inland navigable waters.15 6 Nevertheless, because the land
surrounding the Great Salt Lake is extremely flat, small fluctuations of the Lake's elevation cause inundation or exposure
of large areas of land in a short period of time. Moreover, vegetation and erosion lines are incapable of determination on
the shores of the Lake. 15 The absence of these indicia made
determination of the OHWL nearly impossible. Because the
meander line was considered by the Special Master to be the
most reliable evidence of the OHWL, he adopted that alternative boundary as urged by the State of Utah. 159 Of special
interest are the criteria that the Special Master used to solve
the boundary problem.
[I] t would seem that custom, mutual acceptance and
recognition, congressional and executive conduct, as
well as scientific data, are allowable aids to the solution of the present problem... . In combination those
factors seem to the Special Master to point to the

153.

in fact on certain private property. Since the trespass consisted of fill and road construction that had obliterated the actual water line, the court felt that it was unfair
to require the property owner to produce evidence of the actual boundary.
Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 940 (1972).

154. Utah v. United States, 420 U.S. 304 (1975).
155. Utah v. United States, 425 U.S. 948 (1976).
156. See note 144,supra, at 255.
157.
158.

Id.
Id. at 306-07.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1977

27

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 13 [1977], Iss. 2, Art. 5

492

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XIII

surveyed meander line as the most rational delineation of the statehood boundary now available. 159
Use of the meander line as an alternative to the ordinary
high water line presents both practical and legal problems.
The meander line may be highly inaccurate, reflecting errors
in surveying or failing to reflect changes in the shoreline since
the original survey. If the meander line is below the OHWL
the state may lose ownership and control of a valuable resource, while if the line is significantly shoreward of the
OHWL, the riparian owner may lose some of his valuable
riparian rights.
From the legal viewpoint, the meander line is arguably
unacceptable as a standard boundary line because the private
owner may not be deprived of his riparian rights to accretion
without due process. Since meander lines do not fluctuate
with changes in water levels or land contours, they are analogous to the attempts by some states to fix boundaries as of
statehood which have been declared unconstitutional. 160 Conversely, a meander line below the OHWL would not adversely
affect the riparian owner, but the validity of such a boundary
designation would depend upon the state's concept of the
public trust doctrine. Because that doctrine is regarded as a
judicial restraint on the power of the legislature to alienate
lands except in the public trust, 6 1 some courts might not
recognize meander line boundaries which in effect give away
sovereignty submerged lands.
Thus, the meander line does not appear to be a reasonable substitute for the OHWL as a general rule. It should be
emphasized that the meander line has only been used where
unusual circumstances caused the determination of the actual
OHWL to be extremely difficult or even impossible. The
meander line is "only an approximation"'6 12 or evidence of
159. Id. at 309. The meander line referred to in this case was pieced together from several segment surveys; one made in 1855, three in 1856 and 1885, two in 1886,

1887, 1899, 1906 and 1912, three in 1913 and 1928, and the closing survey was

made in 1966, Id. at 265 n.24. Thus it did not conform to the water boundary
of the Great Salt Lake as that boundary had ever actually existed.

160. Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290 (1967), (coastal waters); United States v.
Washington, 294 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 817 (1962)
(coastal waters). State v. Florida National Properties, Inc., 338 So.2d 13 (Fla.
1976) (navigable lake).
161. Note, Maryland's Wetlands: The Legal Quagmire, 30 MD. L. REV. 240, 261 (1970).
162.

See Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 557-65 (1970).
See note 144, supra, at 309.
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the OHWL, and as a fixed line is not a satisfactory substitute
for the actual water boundary which is ambulatory in nature.
THE NECESSITY OF AN AMBULATORY LINE
Notwithstanding the furor over Bonelli and Corvallis, this
much is clear: the states cannot fix the OHWL, relative to a
point in time, without doing violence to the principles of accretion and reliction. A very recent Florida Supreme Court
163 illusdecision, State v. Florida National Properties, Inc.,
trates this principle admirably.
In 1971 the Florida Legislature passed a boundary statute16 which is fairly representative of attempts by several
states 65 to fix the OHWL as of the date of statehood. The
statute provided in part that the water's edge, as evidenced at
the date of statehood, would constitute the boundary line of
any navigable meandered freshwater lake.166
At the trial level, 6 7 the circuit court found multiple constitutional infirmities in the statute. The court said that an
application of Hughes through Bonelli required two holdings:
first, that federal law applied over state law, 68 and second,
that any attempt by the state to deprive riparian landowners
of their right to accretion was invalid under federal common
law.

169

163.

338 So.2d 13 (Fla. 1976).

164.

FLA. STAT. § 253.151 (1975).

165. E.g., Harris v. Hylebos Indus., Inc., 81 Wash.2d 770, 505 P.2d 457 (1973); Vavrek
v. Parks, 6 Wash.App. 684, 495 P.2d 1051 (1972); Wilson v. Howard, 5 Wash.App.
169, 486 P.2d 1172 (1971). Washington, however, does not recognize loss of title
by erosion of land abutting lakes, bays or waters treated as lakes or bays if the land
was conveyed by federal grant prior to statehood. This rule relies on the theory
that the state may dispose of its land beneath navigable waters if it desires.
166. "The boundary line shall be established by, or under the supervision of, the board
(of trustees of the internal improvement trust fund) by use of one or more of the
following procedures: (a) where physical evidence exists indicating the actual water's edge of any navigable meandered freshwater lake as of the date such body
came under the jurisdictionof the state, regardless of where the water's edge exists
as of the date of the determination of the boundary line, the water's edge as evidenced on the former date shall be deemed the boundary line." FLA. STAT. §
253.151 (3) (a) (1975) (emphasis added). The statute also established several alternative means for determining the OHWL, including physical inspection, affidavits of local residents, and statistical averaging of stage data.
167. Case No. 74-5-7, Cir. Ct. Highlands County, May 3, 1974.
168. "In order to establish the boundary line, the Court must determine the extent of
the State's title, if any, and to the disputed area. Since the State acquired title to
the bottom lands from the Federal Government, the boundary line is necessarily
controlled by Federal law. Bonelli ... Upon reviewing the applicable law, the court
has concluded that the boundary line between plaintiff's upland property and the
sovereignty bottom lands of Lake Istokpoga is the present ordinary high water
mark . . . This boundary is movable or ambulatory in character, and its location is
subject to change in the future as a result of the processes of accretion, reliction
and erosion." Case No. 74-5-7, Cir. Ct. Highlands County, May 3, 1976, slip op.
at A-36.
169. Id. at A-41-42.
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This position was subsequently adopted by the Florida
Supreme Court. 17 0 That opinion would now be open to question as a result of the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Corvallis, discussed previously. The majority in FloridaNational Properties cited Hughes to hold Section 253.151 unconstitutional as a violation of the supremacy clause of the
United States Constitution, in that it was an attempt by the
This
State to regulate in an area governed by federal law.'
that
state
holding
basis can no longer be used after Corvallis'
law is determinative.
Additionally, however, the Court held that the effect of
the statute was to unlawfully take private property without
the payment of just compensation in violation of the due
process clauses of both the federal and Florida constitutions. 7 ' The attempt by the State to freeze boundaries of
navigable meandered fresh water lakes ignored the principles
of accretion and reliction which, according to the majority,
were rights vested in the owners of lands bounded by navigable water. 17 3 This second basis for finding the statute unconstitutional is not dependent upon federal common law for its
viability and has not been weakened by the subsequent rendering of the Corvallis decision.
THE USE OF STATISTICAL AVERAGING TO
DETERMINE -THE OHWL
As noted at the outset, the predominating rule is that the
OHWL is to be determined from physical marks upon the
banks, 7 4 and not through a statistical averaging process. 175
Use of such a process in this context has in fact been declared
to be reversible error. 76 However, there are several reasons
why this type of methodology has been urged. In certain
areas of the country a stream or river may run wide and deep
during the wet season while containing little or no water during dry months. The application of accretion-reliction theory
under those circumstances is extremely difficult, 77 and an
338 So.2d 13, 17 (Fla.1976).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Howard v. Ingersoll, 54 U.S. (How.) 381 (1851).
Coastal Boundary Mapping, supra note 13. at 195-98.
Willis v. United States, 50 F. Supp. 99 (S.D. W.Va. 1943); Kelly's Creek & Northwestern R.R. Co. v. United States, 100 Ct.Cl. 396 (1943).
177. See, e.g., Snake River Ranch v. United States, 395 F. Supp. 886 (D. Wyo. 1975).
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
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averaging technique might serve to stabilize land boundaries
and, therefore, property rights. 7 ' Further, where statistical
stage data is available, the determination of the OHWL could
arguably be brought closer to a scientific certainty. Such a
determination may have much greater relevance for regulatory purposes than does the traditional definition. 179 Finally,
since the examination of the bank of a water body with reference only to the traditional factors of the OHWL definition
often may reveal several lines of varying distinctness, statistical data can provide invaluable collateral or secondary information as to the OHWL's location. 18 0 For these reasons it is
helpful to examine some possible precedents for the use of
statistical data in this context, and also some of the potential
problems.
Language in the Supreme Court case of Oklahoma v. Texas,' 8 ' lends some support to the use of averaging. The question for determination was the intent of the language in an
early Spanish conveyance which set the boundary along "the
course of the southern bank of the Arkansas" River. 8 2 The
Court apparently did not read Howard v. Ingersoll as excluding the use of averaging. The Court stated:
The boundary intended is on and along the bank at
the average or mean level attained by the waters in
the periods when they reach and wash the bank without overflowing it.18 3
In later proceedings'8 a method of determining the boundary
along the cut banks of the river which apparently included
averaging was validated by the court.
For several reasons, the case can be distinguished from
more recent decisions defining the OHWL for navigable water
bodies. First, the river had already been declared to be nonnavigable. 1 Second, and as a result of this finding, the Court
placed primary reliance on what is perceived to be the intent
of the parties expressed in the conveyance.'8 Since this was
178.
179.
180.

See Motl v. Boyd, 286 S.W. 458 (Tex. 1926).
See 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(2) (h) (ii) (a) (1976).
See FLA. STAT. § 253.151(3) (c) (1975).

181. 260 U.S. 606 (1922).
182. Id. at 623.
183. Id. at 632. Alabama v. Georgia, 64 U.S. 505, 515 (1859) contains almost identical
language and therefore can be cited to the same proposition. See note 27, supra.

184. 265 U.S. 493 (1924).
185.
186.

Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574,591 (1922).
Oklahoma v. Texas, supra note 181, at 633.
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an arid area where water levels fluctuated drastically throughout the course of the year, the application of averaging appears logically to be within this intent. Because of these
major distinguishing factors, there is no reason the decision
should be considered as precedent in cases dealing with the
OHWL of navigable waters, and the later federal decisions discussed above have uniformly adopted the physical test of
Howard v. Ingersoll.
One result of Oklahoma v. Texas, however, was the adoption by Texas of a similar cutbank definition for the determination of the limit of the bed of navigable streams.' 87 In the
case of Maufrais v. State'8 the Supreme Court of Texas asserted that their definition is in "complete harmony" 189 with
Alabama v.Georgia and Howard v. Ingersoll.
The bed of a stream is that portion of its soil which is
alternately covered and left bare as there may be an
increase or diminution in the supply of water, and
which is adequate to contain it at its average and
mean state during an entire year, without reference to
extra freshets of the winter or spring or the extreme
drouths of the summer or autumn .190
The definition itself goes a long way toward explaining why
such a method is necessary. Since floods are extremely prevalent in Texas and similar geographic areas, 191 and since during the dry season the same beds that flooded in spring may
run almost dry, some method is necessary to equitably determine a stable boundary. 192 It remains to be seen whether the
Texas definition will retain its validity.193
Although statistical averaging to determine the OHWL
was the method incorporated in a proposed draft regula187.

Motl v. Boyd, supra note 178.

188.

180 S.W. 2d 144 (Tex. 1944).

189.
190.
191.

Id. at 147.
Id.
See Motl v. Boyd, 286 S.W. 458, 469-70 (Tex. 1926); Snake River Ranch v. United
States, note 177, supra.
Another reason that Texas has stuck to an averaging technique for the determination of the OHWL is that the definition of navigability of streams is determined by
statute in a similar manner. "All streams so far as they retain an average width of
thirty feet from the mouth up shall be considered navigable streams..." TEX.

192.

REV. STAT. art. 5302 (1962). The width of the stream necessary for this statutory
navigability is measured by the width of the bed so defined despite the fact that
the width of the waters in ordinary season does not meet the requirement. This
helps to explain the acceptability of an averaging technique of OHWL determination.

193. Of course it is possible that the courts in recognition of the difficulty of application to arid areas of the traditional OHWL definition, may adopt some variant of
statistical averaging.
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tion' 9 4 promulgated by the Army Corps of Engineers to meet
the requirements of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act, 19 the draft was subsequently discarded and the latest
published rules and regulations of the Corps contain the traditional physical factors test. 9 6 Regardless of what definition
is used by the Corps, it should be clearly borne in mind that
the definition is promulgated for regulatory purposes only 197
and should not be considered an attempt to redefine property
rights. 98 As a regulatory measure under the police power, it
is not subject to the same potential constitutional infirmities
as would be an attempt to redefine the traditional OHWL
property boundary.
Two federal cases are instructive as to why the use of statistical averaging to determine the OHWL for title purposes is
objectionable. Willis v. United States'9 concerned a dam
which the government had constructed to improve the navigation in the Kanawha River in West Virginia. One of the
consequences was the flooding of a strip of plaintiff's land.
The government's argument that official river stage records
should be used to determine the OHWL for compensation
purposes was rejected. The court reasoned that such a method
would be inappropriate because any result reached would depend upon a time period and frequency of occurrence arbitrarily selected by the individual analyst. While useful for engineering purposes, the statistical averaging approach was
"utterly unreliable as a means of determining the respective
rights of the United States and the riparian property owner. "

2 00

Another case involving the same river and a similar flooding situation, Kelly's Creek & Northwestern R.R. Co. v. United States, 201 also rejected the asserted averaging method. The
Court of Claims adopted a variant of the traditional definition 212 and specifically rejected testimony regarding stage
194.
195.

196.
197.
198.

199.
200.
201.
202.

33 C.F.R.

209.120(d) (2) (ii) (a) (1975).

See 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (Supp. 1972); N.R.D.C. v. Callaway, Civ. No. 74-1242 (D.c.

March 27, 1975).
42 Fed. Reg. 37144 (1977).
See United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665 (M.D. Fla. 1974).

As noted above, the private ownership of underlying beds of navigable water bodies
has no bearing on the existence or extent of the dominant navigable servitude.

United States v. Chicago, M:, St. P. & P. R.R. Co., 312 U.S. 592, 596 (1941).
50 F. Supp. 99 (S.D. W.Va.1943).
Id. at 101.
100 Ct. Cl. 396 (1943).
Id. at 406.
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data as "wholly without value. ' 203 Thus, it appears that the
federal courts are unwilling to accept a definition of OHWL
based on statistical averaging, at least where property boundaries are involved.20 4
CONCLUSION

Mr. Justice Curtis' definition of the OHWL in Howard v.
Ingersoll 2 5 is the one most frequently applied in both state
and federal courts. It makes determination of the OHWL dependent upon the examination of several physical factors indicating the common and ordinary level of the water.
The Corvallis decision20 6 may have created uncertainties
as to whether federal or state rules are to be applied in determining boundaries in tidally-affected areas, but it seems
clear that state rules will now be applied in determining property boundaries along non-tidal inland navigable waterbodies.
This does not mean that the states are free to adopt whatever
rules they please. Any attempt to permanently freeze such
boundaries such as those made by the states of Washington
and Florida, would still run into state as well as federal constitutional problems related to the taking issue.
Moreover, the Bonelli concept, that rapid boundary
changes may be treated as accretion where navigation-related
interests are not involved and riparian rights to navigable waterbodies are in need of protection, 20 7 may still be adopted as
state law in those states which desire to do so. Perhaps it is
fair to conclude that while the states are now free to apply
and develop their own rules of law with respect to non-tidal
fresh water boundaries, the concept recently developed by
the federal judiciary in Bonelli2 08 may lead to a re-thinking of
such rules by the states, looking toward more equitable solutions to the problem created by the ambulatory nature of
such boundaries. The dynamic character of the hydrologic
203.
204.

205.
206.
207.
208.

Id.
The recent Florida case, State v. Florida National Properties, Inc., 338 So.2d 13
(Fla. 1976), invalidated an averaging technique required by Florida statute. FLA.
STAT. § 253.151(3)(c) (1975). This resulted, however, from a finding that this
provision was not severable, and not from any analysis of the efficacy of statistical
averaging.
54 U.S. 381, 427 (1851).
Corvallis, supra note 108.
Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, supra note 96, at 328Id.
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factors that play a part in the creation of the OHWL may call
for flexible approaches by the states in resolving disputes
over their inland navigable water boundaries.
The ambulatory nature of the actual water boundary
makes use of the surveyed meander line as an alternative to
the OHWL impractical and legally problematic. Use of the
meander line or any other fixed boundary, such as a natural
water boundary frozen as of a particular date, is subject to
constitutional challenge as a deprivation of riparian rights.
While a determination of the OHWL by use of mathmatical
averaging would provide an ambulatory line,there is authority
holding such a method unconstitutional due to the inherently
arbitrary nature of the selection of data for analysis.
Consistent with the idea that the law should strive to conform as nearly as it is practical and feasible to do so with the
state of things as they actually exist, the boundary for title
purposes between sovereignty submerged lands and privatelyowned uplands should be based on a delineation of the water's
true boundary. In addition, because actual water boundaries
are ambulatory in nature, the legal boundary for title purposes
must change with the movement of the water's edge. After
much controversy and debate, the OHWL, as determined by
reference to physical indicators of the true water-land boundary, is still recognized by the courts, both federal and state,
as the true boundary except in very unusual circumstances.
In applying these legal rules to accurately locate the line on
the ground, the legal profession will require the aid of experts
from many disciplines, often including biologists, geologists
and land surveyors. It is hoped that the legal guidelines set
forth in this article may assist the legal profession in working
with these experts to more accurately locate this sometimes
elusive boundary line.
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